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No Miracle Remedies in Sight for Financing Health Care
for the Poor
John M. Kuder, PhD*

ow the nationfinanceshealth care for people under age 65
who are unable to pay for care themselves has long been the
subject of vigorous criticism from analysts of all political spectrums. Cunent mechanisms that finance such care (charity,
cross-subsidization, and a multitude of public programs at all
levels of government) are expensive and have left many unfulfilled expectations. Changes in the cunent system are necessary to assure this population of good quality, accessible health
care at an affordable cost. However, designing and implementing such a system that is both efficient and equitablyfinancedis
a difficuh task.
Despite the proposal and implementation of a large number of
experimental programs, none has satisfied all interest groups,
mainly because each group has a different perspective regarding
an efficient and equitablefinancingsystem. Although some general trends in reform programs are appearing, the near future of
health carefinancingfor the poor will likely continue to be characterized by experimentation and uncertainty.
While there are numerous approaches to these issues, only
government-sponsored programs are reviewed and financial
considerations emphasized herein. The many voluntary program options and nonfinancial issues are important subjects
which merit lengthy discussion, and therefore will not be
addressed.

H

"Although some general trends in reform
programs are appearing, the near future of
health care financing for the poor will likely
continue to be characterized by experimentation
and uncertainty."

Problems with the Medicaid Program
Much debate over reforms is based on perceptions of the
Medicaid program which is intricately linked to governmentsponsored welfare programs. The Medicaid program was designed to provide a mixture of federal and state financing for
medical care to the poor This federal program defines a minimum benefit package and a minimum eligible population. State
govemments at their own discretion can broaden both the benefits and the eligibility requirements with a guarantee that the
federal govemment will pay a significant portion of the expenditures. Accordingly, each state has set up a different system.
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Many states have expanded the eligible population well beyond
the categorically needy group, the minimum set by federal legislation. In addition, some state govemments have expanded the
benefit package to include services beyond the set minimum.
Other states, however, provide only the minimum benefits and
limit coverage only to those eligible for federal welfare
assistance, primarily recipients of AFDC (aid to families with
dependent children) and SSI (supplemental security income).
Most states supplement Medicaid through independent state,
county, and local govemment programs. These frequentiy include subsidies for public hospital systems which provide services to the medically indigent who are not eligible for Medicaid. As a result, each state has a different set of programs for
financing care for the poor Until recently, Arizona had refused
to participate in the Medicaid program at all, but now contracts
with the federal government under a limited experimental
program.
Historically, one significant means of financing care for
needy patients has been a form of cross-subsidization sometimes
refened to as cost-shifting. Under such programs all or part of
the hospital cost of treating patients who do not pay their bills
may become reimbursable through a third-party payment system. Also, self-pay patients may be charged a price substantially
above the cost of their treatment to cover the costs of charity
care. Thus hospitals become agents for redistributing resources
from the insured population, the tax-paying public, and self-pay
patients, to those who lack the means to pay for their own hospital care.
This web offinancingmechanisms has been more expensive
than was anticipated when the Medicaid program wasfirstimplemented. In 1984 total Medicaid expenditures were over $34
billion (I). While the annual rate of increase in expenditures has
been substantially below that of the Medicare prograin, in recent
years Medicaid has been the fastest growing component of aggregate state spending and is growing faster than state revenues.
Federal govemment officials are distressed by their inability to
control Medicaid costs. Under the program the federal govemment has an almost open-ended commitment to match increased
funding at the state level. This problem of cost containment is
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Table 1
Ratio of Medicaid Recipients to Persons Below the Poverty
Level, Top Five and Bottom Five States, Fiscal Year 1982
State
1. Hawaii
2. Califomia
3. Rhode Island
4. Michigan
5. Massachusetts
45. Utah
46. Texas
47. Wyoming
48.Idaho
49. South Dakota

Ratio of Recipients
to Persons in Poverty
104
83
77
72
69
21
20
20

particularly difficult because, until very recentiy, most states reimbursed medical care providers through the mechanism originally used by Medicare—cost-based payment to hospitals and
usual, customary, and reasonable fees for physicians. This
method of reimbursement does not encourage provider efficiency. The 180% increase in Medicaid expenditures between
1975 and 1984 has led analysts and others concemed with govemment budget deficits to seek a cheaper, if not better, method
of reimbursement (1).
Many critics point out that Medicaid expenditures are misunderstood. In 1984 43% of total Medicaid expenditures were for
nursing home care. Only 25% of the total was for care of AFDC
recipients, while 75% was for the aged, blind, and disabled.
Only $8.5 billion were spent by the Medicaid program for persons not aged, blind, or disabled, and nearly half this amount,
$4.08 billion, was spent for the care of children (1). Thus, the
Medicaid system largelyfinancesthe care of children, the blind,
and the disabled, and nearly half its expenditures are for longterm services rather than acute medical care.
The current health care system for the poor is cited for
extreme fragmentation with large coverage gaps and major regional variations in both eligibility standards and program benefits. Of those households below the federal poverty level in
1982, only 13.2% had some form of employer-provided health
insurance, only 37.5% were covered by Medicaid, and 49.3%
had no public or private health insurance (2). Of those individuals in the Detroit area who had been unemployed for three
or more months, Berki et al reported that 26% had lost their
health insurance and that 75% of these households were not protected under Michigan's Medicaid program, despite eligibility
standards more liberal than the average state (3).
Because state governments determine Medicaid eligibility
and payment levels for AFDC families, standards vary widely
from state to state (Table 1). In 1982 the ratio of the number of
Medicaid recipients to the number of persons below the poverty
level ranged from a low of 0.29 in Wyoming to a high of 1.24 in
Massachusetts. In 1980 the proportion of poor children covered
by Medicaid was 20% for Wyoming and 72% for Massachusetts
(4). In short, the Medicaid system, despite its substantial contri-
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Usual fee
Blue Shield
Medicaid

All Primary
Care

Specialty
General
Surgeon

ObstetricsGynecology

$14.80
$12.97
$9.00

$15.51
$13.11
$8.78

$18.28
$15.34
$10.33

(From Health Care Administration and National Opinion Research Center, 1976-1977
surveys. Cromwell J, Burnstein P. Physician losses from Medicare and Medicaid discounts: How real are they? Health Care Financing Review 1985;6[summer]:5l-68.)

l.s
17

(From Health Care Financing Program Statistics. Analysis of State Medicaid Program
Characteristics. 1984. Health Care Financing Administration, Publication No 03204.)

, Templs

Table 2
Reported Usual Fees and Insurer Allowables for Office
Visits by Physician Specialty, 1976 to 1977

bution to the improvement in health care, leaves large coverage
gaps and permits substantial regional variations in health insurance coverage of the poor
Hospitals, physicians, and other providers of health care to
the poor all are critics of the current financing systems. Providers have long complained of low payment levels and the lack
of adequate programs to pay for uninsured patients. The burden
imposed on hospitals to care for the poor is unevenly distributed.
Medicaid pays for approximately 10% of all hospital expenses
across the nation, but many hospitals receive a much larger per-

"Medicaid reimburses physicians at rates below
usual fee levels. This places afinancialconstraint
on practitioners who serve the poor, and is a
disincentive for physicians to treat the poor with
the same standard of care as for patients who pay
higherfees."

centage of their revenue from Medicaid. About one-fourth ofthe
university-owned teaching hospitals in this country are heavily
dependent on the Medicaid program which provides over 20%
of their revenue (5). Fewer than 10% of the nation's hospitals
provide 40% of the nation's free care (6). At the other end ofthe
scale, data from the Hospital Cost and Utilization Project ofthe
National Center for Health Services Research indicate that
nearly half of urban voluntary hospitals provide little or no
uncompensated care (7).
Medicaid reimburses physicians at rates below usual fee levels. This places afinancialconstraint on practitioners who serve
the poor, and is a disincentive for physicians to treat the poor
with the same standard of care as for patients who pay higher
fees. Cromwell and Bumstein recentiy reported that in 1976 to
1977 the surgeons' average fee for gall bladder surgery was
$686, Blue Shield paid an average of $588, and the average
Medicaid payment was $323 (8). A similar pattem of fee/payment stmcture was found for other physician services (Table 2).
This disparity points out a major dilemma faced by policymakers; identifying and implementing a funding program
that encourages efficiency and provision of quality care for the
poor and contains aggregate cost levels.
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Pressure is increasing to reform the current systems for
financing medical care of the poor Increasingly providers are
forced by price competition, excess capacity, and payment programs based on diagnostic related groups (DRGs) to monitor
and control theirfinancialposition. In addition, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other altemative delivery systems are extracting discounts from providers and increasingly
are unwilling to pay the hidden tax of cross-subsidization. Thus
hospitals have continually less opportunity to shift onto others
the cost of treating the poor Inevitably, hospitals respond with
attempts to lower the volume of charity and discounted care they
provide to the poor Between 1980 and 1982 private hospitals in
communities with large increases in poverty and decreased
Medicaid coverage actually reduced the amount of free care they
provided, while public hospitals in the same areas increased the
amount of free care given (6). Under these conditions, policies
that increase restrictions on eligibility, reduce benefits, and/or
extract higher discounts from providers of services to the poor
(without making changes in delivery system incentives) have a
direfinancialimpact on providers. Thus, more restrictive policies can only reduce access to services for the poor Clearly,
providers committed to serving the poor must find a means to
deliver high-quality services without incurring severe financial
risk. Given current uncertainty about the future direction of
financial programs, this mandate is proving difficult to
accomplish.

"Experimental programs have trouble enrolling
the poor voluntarily into alternative delivery
systems. The poor are reluctant to give up
uninhibited choice of a provider without
receiving added program benefits."

What Shall We Try Next?
To examine altematives to the cunent system, govemments at
all levels have entered a period of trial-and-error experimentation. A variety of issues are being addressed by a multitude of
innovative approaches, but the thrust of these reforms can be
characterized under four major topics; 1) seeking new sources of
revenue, 2) becoming more pmdent purchasers by limiting provider participation, 3) altering provider payment mechanisms,
and 4) employing altemative delivery systems. The success or
failure of each of these new approaches, as a response to criticisms of the current system, will provide the basis of future
policies.

New sources of revenue
One new initiative for states is to seek new sources of revenue
to pay for services. Florida enacted a 1.5% tax on hospital revenues, with the tax revenue to be used to support the Medicaid
program. The effect of such a program is essentially to crosssubsidize care for the needy at the state level rather than at the
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hospital level. This approach has been criticized for not spreading the cost widely enough. It taxes the sick and insured and may
impact various insurers and hospitals differently, especially
those that have for-profit status versus those with not-for-profit
status. West Virginia and South Carolina have recently enacted
similar tax programs, and other states are considering this
initiative.
Prudent purchasing programs
To reduce program costs, several state govemments have attempted to create a more competitive market by limiting the
number of provider contracts for care to the poor Califomia and
Arizona have implemented such programs with selective contracts with hospitals. These contracts are awarded through a
modified bidding process. Negotiated fee stmctures are important in determining which hospitals receive contracts and which
do not. In both states the programs have saved large amounts of
money without reducing the quality of care provided. Despite
potential cost-savings from these programs, there is concem that
they may foster a deterioration in quality of and access to service
resulting in two-tier medicine, ie, medical care in which different, usually inferior, care is given to the poor
The effect of Califomia's hospital bidding process is difficult
to evaluate. The program was part of a package of sweeping reforms which included substantial changes in eligibility requirements and shifting of responsibility for muchfinancingback to
the counties. During the first year of the program, the state of
Califomia claims to have saved $235.4 million from the contracting program alone (9). However, hospitals reported a 22%
increase in revenue deductions from bad debt, charity care, and
contractual allowances during this period (9). If the contracting
program is to be successful, it must not cut hospitals' abilities to
provide services to the poor, and policymakers must be careful
to avoid the adverse impact these cuts may have on hospitals
which predominately serve low-income groups. In Califomia
the possible negative impact of these reforms was tempered by
the Medicaid program, Medi-Cal, which has always been generous in terms of eligibility and benefits.
In Arizona the competitive bidding system seems to have contained costs and provided services at an acceptable level of quality during its initial two years. However, this program has been
criticized for its nanow eligibility standards which impose significant access barriers to the large number of people who do not
qualify for the state program (10). Although the new program
may be an improvement for some, the plan has created problems
for many county hospitals and the medically indigent ineligible
for the program.
Innovations In provider payment
Another area of reform in many states is the mechanism by
which the state pays providers for services. The system of costbased payment for hospital services and usual, customary, and
reasonable payment for physician services does not provide incentives for efficiency. Most states have moved toward some
form of prospective payment system. Several states, including
Kansas, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, have adopted DRG-based
hospital payment schemes for their Medicaid programs, which
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are similar to those used in the Medicare system. Perhaps the
most ambitious programs of hospital payment reform are the allpayer systems in Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.
Reforming hospital payment programs is difficult, but making meaningful changes in physician payment methods is more
troublesome. One altemative is the use of fixed fee schedules.
The use of some form of ambulatory DRGs has been proposed,
but does not appear practical at present. The only payment systems that incorporate all services are the numerous experimental
programs employing capitation methods.
The basic elements of the all-payer type of hospital payment
programs are simple. In essence, all third-party payers agree to
pay each hospital according to the same prospectively determined formula. The resulting rate incorporates consideration for
the volume of uncompensated care the hospital provides. In theory, the formula eliminates cross-subsidization and the possibtiity of extracting discounts by individual insurance plans. It
also should help maintain thefinancialviability of hospitals that
serve the poon The process for establishing hospital rates is different in each state trying this approach. However, in each case
the rate has been established through a negotiation process,
which results in a highly regulatory environment. Thus, in
retum for increased financial viability and payment for uncompensated care, hospitals have had to yield much individual autonomy. One problem with this all-payer approach is the failure
to address the issue of paying for nonhospital services. There is
debate about whether these programs are able to contain hospital
costs sufficientiy to offset their large administrative costs (11).
An altemative to the highly regulated approach of rate-fixing
is to pay providers for treating the poor by a capitation method.
Through this approach providers receive a fixed payment for
each individual they accept for treatment during a specified
period of time. Under capitation, the providers (hospital, clinic,
or individual physician) accept some or all of thefinancialrisk of
caring for the enrolled patients. Capitation, which encourages
cost-efficiency, has been the comerstone policy of many successful alternative delivery systems such as HMOs and prefened provider organizations. With this approach, HMOs have
demonstrated an ability to contain health care costs by reducing
hospital utilization rates (12). However, capitation has many
problems when it is applied to programs designed to finance
care for the medically indigent.

Alternative delivery systems and the poor
The capitation principle of provider payment involves enrolling the poor into existing or newly established altemative delivery systems and paying providers in those systems on a capitation basis. Two immediate problems present themselves. First,
altemative delivery systems and other potential providers of care
have been reluctant to accept the poor as major parts of their programs under risk contract (13). As yet, there is inadequate experience for setting capitation rates for this type of population. The
ability to predict enrollee service needs, a requirement for setting capitation rates for these population groups, is very limited.
Providers fearing adverse risk selection (the acceptance of too
many very sick patients and too few healthy patients) are often
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Table 3
Medicaid HMO Enrollment, Top Five States, June 1984
State
California
Michigan
New York
Ohio
Arizona
All other states
Total all states

Enrollment
100,394
87,448
22,065
10,211
8,909
120,352
349,379

(From National HMO Census, 1984. Excelsior, MN: InterStudy, 1985.)

unwilling to accept large scale capitation-based risk contracts at
a price govemments are willing to pay.
A second problem is that experimental programs have trouble
enrolling the poor voluntarily into altemative delivery systems.
The poor are reluctant to give up uninhibited choice of a provider without receiving added program benefits. In Pennsylvania an intensive program to enroll Medicaid recipients into
HMOs enrolled only 12,000 recipients in over three years. I f a
capitation system is to resolve some of the problems of the current system, voluntary programs may have to give way to mandatory programs.
Existing HMOs have little incentive to enroll the poor, and the
poor have been reluctant to join HMOs. In 1984 only 349,379
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs nationwide (14). This
represents only about 1.4% of the estimated 25 million Medicaid
recipients during 1984, a percentage approximately the same as
in 1981 (Table 3). The majority of HMO Medicaid enrollment
occurs in the three metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, Detroit,
and New York.
Recently, several experimental programs which incorporate
case-management or gate-keeper policies into programs to
finance care for the poor have been initiated. A gate-keeper program requires that individual enrollees in a plan choose a primary care physician or clinic as their case manager The primary
care physician must arrange all needed medical care, including
refenals to specialists and admissions to the hospital. The patient must obtain all provided services except emergencies
through the primary physician. The use of existing provider arrangements is one advantage ofthis type of program. Although
there is little evidence about the performance of gate-keeper systems, advocates argue that 1) the quality of care is enhanced by
improving the continuity of care; and 2) patient care cost is
lowered by reducing unnecessary referrals, hospital admissions, and use of the emergency room (15).
The experience of one of the first gate-keeper systems, the
SAFECO plan, indicates that the program may not lower
patient-care cost unless the case-managers have a strong incentive to ration care (16). A Medicaid experimental program in
Philadelphia places the case-manager atfinancialriskfor most
patient-care expenditures via a capitation-based payment program. A similar program in Boston failed to gain widespread
support among either providers or the poor The Philadelphia
program attempts to avoid inadequate participation by making
beneficiary enrollment mandatory. These small experimental
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programs are being carefully watched before prepaid case-management plans are implemented on a large scale.
Significant problems with all the HMO and case-management
approaches result from the fluctuating population eligible for
most Medicaid and indigent care programs. Moving in and out
of employment and other eligibility categories makes it difficult
to enroll this population long enough to take advantage of measures for reducing health care costs. Few states seem willing or
financially able to fund health care during transition periods in a
person's eligibility status.

"Concerned policymakers must not ignore that
the poor population is more often sick and more
difficult to treat effectively than the nonpoor."

Vouchers and geographic capitation
The use of vouchers is another proposal discussed by critics of
the cunent system. Under this proposal vouchers would be issued to the poor to purchase health insurance in the private market. The plan is designed to increase competition and contain
costs without direct govemment intervention. No voucher plan
has gained enough political support to go beyond the proposal
stage, but if political conservatives continue to gain power in
Congress such a plan may be anticipated.
Recently, a reform proposal called geographic capitation has
been proposed in the federal govemment. Rather than a fundamental reform, geographic capitation appears to be a plan to put
atfinancialriskstate govemments and the intermediaries administering public insurance programs. Block-grant funding for
public health insurance programs could reduce the federal govemment's open-ended commitment to state Medicaid programs
and bring federal expenses under firm budgetary control. Geographic capitation programs would change the cunent system
very little but would transfer much of the financial risk to
state governments and to the private administrators of public
programs.

Discussion and Conclusions
At present there appears to be no consensus regarding the direction that should be taken to refonn the system. There is, however, growing political consensus that reform is indeed required.
As a result, the current pattem of innovation and experimentation is likely to continue. If today's trends do continue, future
initiatives will aim at establishing programs that incorporate
some form of restrictive purchasing policies, competitive bidding, or some other type of selective contracting. Innovative approaches to incorporate the successful components of altemative
delivery systems should continue. In addition, we can expect
measures to assist specific hospitals no longer able to support
care for the poor through cost-shifting. Special taxes to support
indigent care programs will likely be adopted in many states.
Although we are leaming a great deal from these initiatives,
many operational, economic, and political issues must be resolved. Paying for physician services is one of the most pressing
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problems. Solutions that do not restrict the patient's choice nor
reduce participation by providers have been elusive. Also,
whether the public is willing to accept policies that result in twotier medicine has not been resolved.
Finally, there are serious concerns that cost-reduction programs will adversely affect quality of care. The high cost of
treating the poor has been attributed to the financing system
which failed to encourage efficiency. However, concemed policymakers must not ignore that the poor population is more often
sick and more difficult to treat effectively than the nonpoor For
example, poor children are 75% more likely to be admitted to a
hospital in a given year, have 40% more days absent from
school, and suffer from many more chronic ailments (17).
Therefore, policymakers cannot expect two equally efficient
systems delivering the same quality of service to incur similar
patient-care costs if one is treating a poor population and the
other a nonpoor population.
Balancing the public commitment to provide medical care for
the poor with the political mandate to restrain the cost of publicly financed programs presents difficult problems to govemment, to providers of medical care, and to the low-income population. Although each new program is proclaimed the panacea
for ourfinancingand delivery problems, such statements are at
best premature and at worst fraudulent.
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